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Alexander T. Simpson* 
Interstate Commerce, Use Tax, and Aircraft in 
Maryland: From W.R. Grace To Complete Auto 
INTRODUCTION 
This article will analyze the case W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the 
Treasury and argue that it should not have much, if any, persuasive value in a 
Commerce Clause analysis of aircraft taxation.1 Grace held that an aircraft hangared 
in Maryland was immune from taxation because it remained in the stream of 
interstate commerce.2 Grace has never been overruled in Maryland – and, in fact, 
the Court of Special Appeals cited the case as good law in 19873 – despite Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,4 which undermines (and effectively neutralizes) the legal 
premise of Grace. The article will conclude by analyzing Maryland’s regulatory 
scheme, which has made it easier for aircraft owners to avoid taxation,5 despite 
Complete Auto empowering the State to more aggressively tax aircraft use.6 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Commerce Clause & Sales/Use Tax 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power 
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”7 “Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to 
Congress, the [Commerce] Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’ 
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 1. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550 (1969). 
 2. Id. at 559. 
 3. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md. App. 293, 304 (1987), aff’d sub 
nom., 317 Md. 3 (1989) (holding that telephone directories are not exempt from in-transit interstate commerce 
taxation or from regulatory use tax). 
 4. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally MD. CODE, TAX–GEN. § 11-208(c)(1) (2012); MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or 
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”8 More specifically, the “negative 
or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation [that] 
‘imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace[.]’”9 In other words, “[t]he 
Commerce Clause balance tips against [a state] tax . . . when it unfairly burdens 
commerce by exacting more than a just share from the interstate activity.”10 
One “common example of an intrastate burden for which a state may impose 
a . . . tax is a sales tax,”11 which is “imposed on persons who purchase goods in-
state.”12 Use tax, on the other hand, is “imposed on persons who purchase goods 
out-of-state where those goods were not subject to a sales tax[.]”13 Thus, the taxes 
are complementary: “even though [they] are differen[t] in substance, they both tax, 
essentially, the use and enjoyment of personal property and operate to balance the 
respective burdens on intrastate and interstate commerce[.]”14 Currently, § 11-
102(a) of the Maryland Code Tax-General Article provides that, unless an 
exemption applies, “a tax is imposed on . . . (1) a retail sale in the State; and . . . (2) 
a use, in the State, of tangible personal property or a taxable service.”15 
B. The Grace Case: The Maryland Court of Appeals’ View 
In W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
examined when a tax on aircraft offends the Commerce Clause.16 Grace, a 
Connecticut corporation with a division in Maryland, purchased two airplanes 
which were used “regularly and exclusively for the transportation of passengers and 
property, primarily executives and customers of Grace, across state lines and 
national boundaries to various Grace plants throughout the North American 
 8. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (finding that the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine invalidated a higher surcharge on solid wastes from other states). 
 9. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) (finding that local exemptions to sales and use taxes are not 
unconstitutional)). 
 10. Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978) (holding that 
Washington’s tax on stevedoring activities does not violate the Commerce Clause, as all interstate commerce 
activities were within the State). 
 11. Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 151 (2011) (finding that Maryland’s Special 
Nonresident Tax does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine because the tax satisfies the 
compensatory tax doctrine). 
 12. Id. at 162. 
 13. Id. (emphasis added). See also Foss NIRSystems, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 151 Md. App. 44, 
54 (2003) (“Generally, the use tax only applies to transactions subject to the sales tax but on which no tax has 
been paid.”). 
 14. Frey, 422 Md. at 160. 
 15. MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11-102 (2012). The sales and use tax rate in Maryland is currently 6% of the 
article’s purchase price. See MD. CODE., TAX-GEN. § 11-104 (2012). 
 16. 255 Md. 550, 554, 558 (1969). 
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continent,” including the Maryland plant.17 Both airplanes were purchased outside 
of Maryland, flown immediately post-purchase to other states, and eventually the 
planes were hangared at Friendship Airport in Maryland for approximately ten days 
per month between flights.18 
The Maryland Comptroller assessed Grace a use tax on the airplanes for “the 
privilege of using, storing, or consuming the [airplanes] within the State,”19 which 
was first affirmed by the Maryland Tax Court20 and subsequently by the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City.21 On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Grace 
argued, inter alia, that “the two airplanes were used exclusively as instruments of 
interstate commerce and the privilege of such use is not subject to local taxation.”22 
To determine whether the taxation of Grace’s airplanes ran afoul of the 
Commerce Clause, the Grace Court framed the test as whether “the article to be 
taxed is employed” in a “local activity” that is “separate” from its movement in 
interstate commerce and sufficient to constitute a “taxable moment.”23 “This 
‘taxable moment’ . . . must be a clearly distinguishable termination of the interstate 
movement and a separate local activity prior to the rededication of the property to 
interstate commerce.”24 This test applied the so-called “Spector rule,” named after 
Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor.25 Spector, and other then-valid precedents, 
interpreted the Commerce Clause as immunizing an article from state taxation so 
long as it remained in the stream of interstate commerce.26 
In Grace, the Court of Appeals held that there was no taxable moment and 
reversed the tax assessment: 
The Comptroller urged upon us that because the aircraft were based at 
Friendship [Airport], they were ‘stored’ in Maryland and were, therefore, 
subject to state taxation. In our opinion, however, the airplanes are not 
 17. Id. at 552. 
 18. Id. at 551–53 (stating that Grace used the aircraft for business approximately twenty days per month 
and the aircraft remained in Friendship Airport when not in use). 
 19. Id. at 559. The tax imposed on Grace totaled $33,481.60 for the period of June 14, 1961 to March 8, 
1966. Id. at 552. 
 20. Id. at 551. 
 21. Id. 
 22. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550, 556 (1969). 
 23. Id. at 559. 
 24. Id. at 561. 
 25. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
 26. See KSS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 282 (1987) (stating that the Spector rule “assumes 
that the aircraft, while an instrumentality of interstate commerce, is not taxable unless a ‘taxable moment’ in 
which the aircraft is not in interstate commerce can be identified”), aff’d sub nom., 11 N.J. Tax 89 (1989), cert 
denied, 118 N.J. 184 (1989). See also R. Douglas Harmon, Note, Judicial Review Under Complete Auto Transit: 
When Is a State Tax on Energy-Producing Resources “Fairly Related’?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682, 686 n.32 (1982) 
(instructing that the traditional doctrine was most clearly articulated in Spector, which “declared 
unconstitutional a state tax on the ‘privilege of doing business’ within the state by a company engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce”). 
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“stored” at Friendship Airport. “Storage” connotes the removal of the object 
from service. The evidence in the present case indicates that the airplanes 
are in constant service and are used whenever the business of Grace requires 
that use. All physical equipment used in interstate commerce must, of 
necessity, be temporarily out of such use from time to time, if for no other 
reason than to be refueled, repaired and maintained. The aircraft of 
commercial airlines are regularly placed in hangars at Friendship Airport 
and, indeed, are “based” in Maryland, yet the Comptroller has conceded 
that these aircraft have not been and are not subject to the Maryland use 
tax. Again, tractors and trailers of interstate traders are “based” at 
Maryland trucking terminals but have not been subjected to the use tax. 
The lower court concluded that a “taxable moment,” or separable local 
activity, existed in the present case apparently because of the testimony of 
one witness that the airplanes did not fly for approximately 10 days a 
month. This testimony, however, was an overall “estimate”; the logs of the 
two airplanes demonstrate that the days on which no flights occurred were 
rather evenly distributed throughout each month and that there was no 
fixed or regularly recurring 10 day period in each month. The mere 
cessation of flight and lapse of time between the flights of aircraft does not, 
in itself, indicate a withdrawal of the aircraft from interstate commerce. It is 
apparent that airplanes cannot be constantly in motion but must make 
stopovers from time to time. In order to sustain a local use tax, the interstate 
event or ‘taxable moment’ is not merely one of a series of such stopovers. 
. . . . In summary, it is our opinion that the two airplanes did not engage in 
any local activity which can be realistically separated from their use in 
interstate commerce.27 
 
C. A Fall from Grace 
Although one tribunal stated that Grace was “correctly decided on its facts,”28 Grace 
is, undoubtedly, a problematic case. First, as a matter of common sense, it is 
dubious that the airplanes’ hangarage for approximately ten days per month was 
insufficient to remove the airplanes from the stream of commerce.29 
Second, “it would appear that the court held that both [airplanes] became 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce prior to their arrival in the taxing state” 
 27. W. R. Grace & Co., 255 Md. at 564–66. 
 28. In re Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., No. 78-30-6B-A, 1981 WL 88974, at *6 (Iowa Dept. Rev. Apr. 29, 
1981). 
 29. See Inter-State Nurseries, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 164 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Iowa 1969) (stating that 
when personal property is purchased out of state and delivered in-state to the owner, “movement within the 
channels of interstate commerce end[s]. . . . and the product [comes] to rest in [the] state,” thus subjecting the 
owner to a use tax). 
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merely because “[n]either airplane was [initially] delivered in Maryland . . . .”30 The 
use of this factor is problematic in a Commerce Clause analysis because it 
gives the purchaser control over whether it is subject to tax liability. If the 
aircraft is brought directly to its home base state, the purchaser is subject to 
a use tax. If the aircraft is used to transport passengers or property in 
interstate commerce in the few days preceding its passage to its home base 
state, the purchaser is not subject to use tax in its home base state and may 
never be subject to a sales or use tax.31 
Third, 
Following W.R. Grace, a number of aircraft owners [unsuccessfully] argued 
that the Commerce Clause prohibited the State from imposing use tax, even 
where the aircraft was based in the State (a “resident aircraft”). 
However, in all of those cases, the courts either disagreed with the Maryland 
Court or were able to find that a “taxable moment” had occurred which 
removed the aircraft from the protection of the Commerce Clause.32 
In sum, there was “a fall from Grace” among the jurisprudence.33 
D. The Complete Auto Case: The Supreme Court Charts a New Course 
Eight years after Grace, the Supreme Court decided Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady,34 “[t]he seminal case regarding the issue of validity of a state use tax vis-a-vis 
the commerce clause . . . .”35 In Complete Auto, a Mississippi tax on the “privilege” 
of doing business in the state was assessed against Complete Auto and affirmed by a 
local court.36 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Complete Auto’s 
 30. Sundstrand Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 34 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698 (1975). See also In re Woods Corp., 
1975 OK 19, 23 (1975) (“The court apparently held the aircraft became instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce prior to arrival in the taxing state.”). Although the Grace Court did not explicitly make that point, 
“Grace does mention the fact that the planes had made other interstate journeys on their owner’s business 
before landing for the first time at Friendship.” King v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 647 S.W.2d 524, 530 (Mo. 
1983) (Blackmar, J., dissenting). 
 31. KSS Transp. Corp., 9 N.J. Tax at 282. 
 32. Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of Fractional Programs: “Flying over Uncharted Waters”, 67 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 241, 295, 297 (2002); see First Nat’l City Bank v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 310, 319 (1983) (“[T]he 
case law of various other jurisdictions, where the application of a use tax to airplanes was discussed, shows no 
difficulty in finding a taxable moment between the point in time when the aircraft were delivered to the 
taxpayer and that point in time when the taxpayer commenced using the airplanes in interstate commerce.”). 
 33. Sundstrand Corp., 34 Ill. App. 3d at 699. 
 34. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 35. Exxon Corp. v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 783 P.2d 685, 689 (Wyo. 1989). 
 36. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 274–75. 
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“attack [wa]s based solely on decisions of [the Supreme] Court holding that a tax 
on the ‘privilege’ of engaging in an activity in the State may not be applied to an 
activity that is part of interstate commerce,” i.e., the Spector rule.37 
In invalidating the Spector rule, the Court stated that the rule “has no 
relationship to economic realities,”38 and observed that other Supreme Court 
decisions had “rejected the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from 
state taxation.”39 Rather, a tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge “when the 
tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is 
fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is 
fairly related to the services provided by the State.”40 
The Complete Auto test represents the final stanza of the Supreme Court’s 
evolution on the taxation of interstate commerce: 
Originally, the commerce clause prohibited state taxation of interstate 
commerce; then the clause was construed to permit some taxation, but only 
if the instrumentality of interstate commerce had a “taxable moment” in 
the taxing state; at present, to determine the propriety of a tax on interstate 
commerce, courts apply the four-prong test enunciated in Complete 
Auto[.]41 
The Complete Auto test focuses on the “nexus” between the taxed entity and the 
taxing state, i.e., a “‘definitive link’ . . . between the state and the person or 
transaction it seeks to tax.”42  Although “[t]he meaning of the term ‘substantial 
nexus’ is unclear,”43 and “[c]ourts have developed different analyses for determining 
whether a taxpayer has a substantial nexus with the State to permit it to be taxed,”44 
courts have nonetheless recognized that such a test is a “more expansive approach” 
and provides states “with greater authority to tax transactions in interstate 
commerce.”45  Simply put, the Complete Auto test “is arguably easier to meet than 
the ‘taxable moment’ doctrine,”46 giving states a greater ability to assess use tax on 
an aircraft that spends time within its borders. 
 37. Id. at 278. 
 38. Id. at 279. 
 39. Id. at 288 (“It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not 
exempt a corporation from state taxation.” (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975))). 
 40. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). 
 41. Square D Co. v. Johnson, 233 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1076 n.4 (1992). 
 42. AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 94 (2008). 
 43. Crowther, supra note 32, at 297. 
 44. In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 485 B.R. 510, 517 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
 45. John P. Barrie, Missouri – When Should Prospective-Only Effect be Given?, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, Sept.–
Oct. 1991, at 188. 
 46. Square D Co., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1076 n.4. 
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In fact, the prevailing view is that the taxable moment test is now extinct: “In 
recent Commerce Clause cases the Supreme Court has consistently applied the 
Complete Auto test without considering the presence of a taxable moment in order 
to determine whether a state may apply a tax on interstate commerce.”47  Thus, the 
Complete Auto test “has replaced the taxable moment test for purposes of 
constitutional analysis.”48 
II. MARYLAND CASE LAW AFTER COMPLETE AUTO: IN NEED OF A TUNE-UP 
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has identified Complete Auto as the 
proper metric in a Commerce Clause analysis,49 Grace has never been overruled in 
Maryland.50  In fact, even after Complete Auto, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals cited Grace for the proposition that a “State is not empowered to tax 
property ‘in transit in interstate commerce,’” and as part of a discussion endorsing 
the taxable moment test.51 
While Grace may technically remain good law in Maryland until the Court of 
Appeals has the opportunity to revisit it, the case should no longer have much – if 
any – persuasive value in a Commerce Clause analysis of aircraft taxation. As one 
commentator observed, “Complete Auto Transit effectively eliminated the argument 
that the Commerce Clause protects a ‘resident aircraft’ from tax[.]”52 
III. MARYLAND’S REGULATORY SCHEME: THE NEW FRONTIER 
To some extent, however, the spirit of Spector and Grace lives on.  Today, Maryland 
exempts from sales and use tax aircraft that are used “principally” in interstate 
commerce.53  The regulation states: 
 47. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021 (1988). 
 48. Kellogg Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 204 Mich. App. 489, 494 (1994). 
 49. See, e.g., AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 93–94 (2008) 
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court established a four-prong test for assessing the validity, under the Commerce 
Clause, of a state tax imposed on a transaction where an out-of-state entity is one of the essential parties” in 
Complete Auto). 
 50. See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550, 566–68 (1969) (holding that 
two airplanes owned by a Connecticut corporation, but based at a Maryland airfield, were not subject to a use 
tax because they transported passengers and property across state lines and foreign commerce). 
 51. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md. App. 293, 304 (1987), 
(identifying the Complete Auto test as the proper analytic framework, but affirming the result of the 
intermediary appellate court without criticizing its use of the taxable moment test), aff’d sub nom., 317 Md. 3 
(1989). 
 52. Crowther, supra note 32, at 297. 
 53. MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11-208(C)(1) (2012); MD CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014). See MD. CODE 
TAX-GEN. § 11-214(2) (allowing a de minimus use exemption, which applies only if the aircraft is in the State 
less than 30 days). 
 Interstate Commerce, Use Tax, and Aircraft in Maryland 
66 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
An aircraft . . . is used principally in interstate or foreign commerce if 
during the first year of its use, or if the use does not extend to 1 year, then 
during the lesser period of use, any one of the following tests is met: 
(1) More than 50 percent of the total mileage traveled is mileage between a 
pickup or delivery point in one state and a pickup or delivery point in 
another state or the District of Columbia (uninterrupted by intervening 
pickups or deliveries), between a pickup or delivery point within the United 
States and a pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between 
pickup and delivery points wholly outside the United States. The mileage 
traveled directly between one pickup or delivery point to another pickup or 
delivery point within the same state or the District of Columbia is not 
qualifying mileage. 
(2) More than 50 percent of all trips between a pickup or delivery point and 
the next pickup or delivery point, are between a pickup or delivery point in 
one state and a pickup or delivery point in another state or the District of 
Columbia, between a pickup or delivery point within the United States and 
a pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between pickup and 
delivery points wholly outside the United States. For the purposes of this 
test, each segment of a fixed or variable route between one pickup or 
delivery point and the next pickup or delivery point is a distinct trip, and 
trips wholly within one state or the District of Columbia are not qualifying 
trips. 
(3) More than 50 percent of the total days of use are days during which 
there has occurred or is occurring a trip between a pickup or delivery point 
in one state and a pickup or delivery point in another state including the 
District of Columbia, between a pickup or delivery point within the United 
States and pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between 
pickup and delivery points wholly outside the United States. A day in which 
trips are made or are being made solely between pickup and delivery points 
within any one state or the District of Columbia is not a qualifying day.54 
In sum, “the exemption generally applies if, during the first year of use, more 
than 50% of the aircraft’s total mileage, trips, or days of use concern travel 
beginning and ending in different states, or between the U.S. and another country 
or wholly outside the U.S.”55 
 54. MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(B). 
 55. Raymond C. Speciale & Ronald D. Golden, Sales and Tax Planning for Aircraft and Aircraft-Related 
Transactions: Checklist Discipline, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, May 2009, at 23, 31. 
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Effectively, Maryland’s regulatory scheme exempts from taxation aircraft that are 
used “principally” in interstate commerce regardless of whether there is a 
“substantial nexus” between the aircraft and Maryland, also known as a “taxable 
moment.”56  This makes it, in application, a more lenient version of the old Spector 
rule, which required aircraft to remain in interstate commerce at all times,57 and far 
more forgiving than the current Complete Auto test.58  Consider, for instance, the 
following hypothetical: a plane sits unused in a Maryland hangar from January 1 
through December 30.  On December 31, the plane flies from Maryland to New 
York.  Although there would clearly be both a “substantial nexus”59 and a “taxable 
moment,”60 under Maryland’s regulatory scheme the aircraft would have been used 
“principally” in interstate commerce for the taxable year, and thus would be 
immune from use tax.61 
CONCLUSION 
Although some have labeled Maryland as a greedy taxer,62 Maryland’s aircraft 
taxation policy is pro-business and taxpayer-friendly.  The State has chosen not to 
tax aircraft in certain circumstances where it is nevertheless constitutionally 
empowered to do so.63  When dealing with aircraft taxation for their clients, 
 56. MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11- 208(C)(1). 
 57. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951). 
 58. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 59. Id. Notably, under a modern Commerce Clause analysis, it is possible for a “substantial nexus” to exist 
between aircraft and state even where more than 50% of an aircraft’s total mileage, trips, or days of use 
concerned travel interstate travel. For example, in Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., Inc., the 
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of use tax on a non-resident aircraft, which was used almost 
18% of the time in Missouri. 734 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. 1987). The court stated: 
Here, even though the plane was hangared and repairs, if needed, were made in Dayton, Ohio, 
there were contacts with Missouri sufficient to create a substantial nexus. During the period 
April 2, 1980, through September 1981, 17.7 percent of the total flight hours were logged on 
flights to Missouri solely for Superior Aircraft’s business. All of these flights, with the exception 
of one for inspecting a construction site, were recorded as being for board meetings of Superior 
Aircraft. The time spent in Missouri for each of those trips ranged from several days to 
approximately a week. 
Id. See also Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 144 Vt. 466, 467–68 (1984) (using an 
aircraft 17% of the time in Vermont justified imposition of a use tax). 
 60. KSS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 282 (1987), aff’d sub nom., 11 N.J. Tax 89 (1989), cert 
denied, 118 N.J. 184 (1989). In Severn Marine, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the tax court held—under the 
Grace standard—that even if a “vessel had not entered into the stream of interstate commerce prior to its 
coming to Maryland. . . . evidence of its nine month stay in [Maryland] indicates its removal from that stream 
and renders it subject to Maryland’s use tax.” No.41, 1976 WL 1440, 1440 (Md. T.C. Dec. 1, 1976). 
 61. MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014). 
 62. See, e.g., Sindhu Madhusudan, Maryland Among Least Tax-Friendly States for Businesses, CITYBIZLIST 
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://baltimore.citybizlist.com/article/maryland-among-least-tax-friendly-states-business; Tax 
Friendly States 2015, MONEY-ZINE (Apr. 4, 2015),  http://www.money-zine.com/financial-planning/tax-
shelter/tax-friendly-states. 
 63. See supra Parts I–III. 
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attorneys and tax professionals should hew to the statutory scheme;64 not only is it 
the current law, but it is also friendlier to taxpayers than Grace, which, in light of 
Complete Auto, cannot be considered a reliable authority. 
 64. See supra Part III. 
